The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense by Reisman, W. Michael & Armstrong, Andrea
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By W Michael Reisman andAndrea Armstrong*
The claim by the United States to a right of what has come to be known as "preemptive self-
defense" has provoked deep anxiety and soul-searching among the members of the college of
international lawyers. Some have feared that the claim signaled a demand for the prospective
legitimation of "Pearl Harbor" types of actions, that is, sudden, massive, and destructive mil-
itary actions "out of the blue," by one state against another in the absence of a state of war, with
the objective of militarily neutralizing or even eliminating a latent or potential adversary. Since
some public intellectuals within the American political system had recommended such a strat-
egy with respect to the People's Republic of China in the midst of the Cold War,' the anxiety
could not be dismissed as entirely unfounded or even hysterical. Nor could it be ignored as if
it were some sort of exclusively American aberration that could be tolerated as the idiosyncrasy
of one state. From the earliest unilateral claims to a continental shelf, a copycat or mimetic
dynamic in modern international law has taken shape whenever an enhancement of state power
has become available, so that the possibility of similar claims to an expanded notion of pre-
emptive self-defense by many other states could not be excluded. Indeed, while the United
States may now have retreated somewhat from its 2002 broad claim to preemption, various
other states (including some with nuclear weapons) have adopted the preemptive self-defense
claim as their own. If the U.S. claim posed potentially destabilizing consequences for world
order, how much more so would proliferation of the claim?
The United Nations Charter's prescription with respect to the use of force is essentially bina-
ry: either a use of military force is in self-defense, as that concept is conceived in the Charter,
in which case it is lawful, or it is not, in which case it is unlawful. As for the right to resort to
military measures in self-defense, it materializes only when the state invoking it has suffered
an "armed attack," a stricture that does not even extend to the Caroline doctrine of anticipatory
self-defense. 2
During the Cold War, the practice of low-level protracted conflicts placed considerable
stress on the Charter regime, and those charged with its application were obliged to ignore the
overt and explicit nuclear threats between the superpowers that had come to constitute the sys-
tem of strategic deterrence. But despite these problems, the International Court ofJustice3 and
most international lawyers have steadfastly insisted on the strict application of the Charter
* Of the Board of Editors; and Yale Law School, JD 2007, respectively. The authors thank Margaret Hellerstein
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'William Buckley, A Noted LiberalAgrees: Lets Destroy Peking' A- Threat Now, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1964, at
A6, available in ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
2 See R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline andMcLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82 (1938); see also W. Michael Reisman, Inter-
national Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 3 (1999) (discussing possible current applications).
3 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admis-
sibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 (Nov. 26); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14 (June 27); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, 1996 ICJ REP.
803 (Dec. 12); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Merits, 2003 ICJ REP. 161 (Nov. 6).
HeinOnline -- 100 Am. J. Int'l L. 525 2006
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
regime, most recently in the Congo v. Uganda decision, 4 which is discussed below. Yet if cus-
tomary international law is in the process of accommodating the U.S. claim to a right of pre-
emptive action-a distinct possibility given the adoption (both full and partial) of the U.S.
claim by other significant states-the possibility of future invocations is increased.
I.
The claim to preemptive self-defense is a claim to entitlement to use unilaterally, without
prior international authorization, high levels of violence to arrest an incipient development
that is not yet operational or directly threatening, but that, if permitted to mature, could be
seen by the potential preemptor as susceptible to neutralization only at a higher and possibly
unacceptable cost to itself.5 Preemptive self-defense differs from anticipatory self-defense in
that those contemplating the latter can point to a palpable and imminent threat. Thus, antic-
ipatory self-defense (which was, in our view, not in the contemplation of the drafters of the
Charter, though claimed by many to have been grafted thereon by subsequent practice) is at
least akin to the armed attack requirement of Charter Article 51, because there may be palpable
evidence of an imminent attack. A claim for preemptive self-defense can point only to a pos-
sibility among a range of other possibilities, a contingency. As one moves from an actual armed
attack as the requisite threshold of reactive self-defense, to the palpable and imminent threat
of attack, which is the threshold of anticipatory self-defense, and from there to the conjectural
and contingent threat of the mere possibility of an attack at some future time, which is the
threshold of preemptive self-defense, the self-assigned interpretive latitude of the unilateralist
becomes wider, yet the nature and quantum of evidence that can satisfy the burden of proof
resting on the unilateralist becomes less and less defined and is often, by the very nature of the
exercise, extrapolative and speculative.6 The evolution of weapons systems that are ever more
rapid and destructive and that may be initiated without warning or with very narrow warning
windows has been invoked as a justification for preemption. But ultimately the central issue
is assessment by the risk-averse security specialists of one international actor of the intentions
of another actor who has or may acquire the weapons. In an international system marked by
radically different cultures, values, and, as a consequence, factual perceptions and their stra-
tegic assessments, an act of preemptive self-defense, based upon one actor's self-perceived good
faith conviction, will often look like serious or hysterical misjudgment to some actors and like
either cynical or self-deluded, naked aggression to others.
When a major international actor claims a new right or its adjustment or termination, the impli-
cations for changing customary international law loom especially large, for, at every level of social
organization, the making of law, much more than its institutional applications, is in great part polit-
ical; doctrines of sovereign equality notwithstanding, the actions of a great power may be more gen-
erative of law than those of smaller states. The question that is posed in this article is whether, in the
period since 2002 when the United States began elaborating its broadest claim, the international
legal system has begun to incorporate it, in whole or in part, even as the United States may have
' Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) (Int'l Ct. Justice Dec. 19,2005)
[hereinafter Congo v. Uganda].
5 The discourse has used different terms to describe this claim throughout the debate on the legality of the use of force.
For an interesting discussion, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE (4th ed. 2005).
6 The inherent difficulty of such exercises is apparent in Taft and Buchwald's contention that the U.S. invasion
of Iraq in 2003 was a lawful use of preemptive military self-defense. William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald,
Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AJIL 557 (2003).
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retreated from it. If its incorporation has in fact begun, a pertinent question for the jurist is whether
the change has significantly affected world public order.
II.
Over the course of the twentieth century, a fair number of U.S. actions that might be char-
acterized as preemptive self-defense-such as military actions in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic before World War I, the military strikes against Tripoli in 1975, and the shelling of
Lebanon after the destruction of the U.S. marine barracks-are better characterized as
responses to ongoing military conflicts. Recent decades have also seen an increase in resort to
military actions to prevent or end crimes against humanity, but these actions were invoked
under the rubric of humanitarian intervention, not preemptive self-defense. One possible fore-
runner of the U.S. unilateral claim to preemptive self-defense would be the Cuban missile cri-
sis, but that was marked by preventive nonmilitary action that shifted the option of an overt
military response to the other party.7
In the modern era, explicit claims to preemptive uses of military force have been associated
preeminently with the administration of George W. Bush, but they were actually pressed by
previous administrations, as well as by other states. In the United States, one can trace a series
of indicators of a shift in official thinking toward preemptive military strategies well prior to
the attacks of September 11, 2001. In 1984 President Ronald Reagan issued a classified
national security decision directive outlining his administration's response to terrorism. An
unclassified extract explains:
State-sponsored terrorist activity or directed threats of such action are considered to be
hostile acts and the U.S. will hold sponsors accountable. Whenever we have evidence that
a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a respon-
sibility to take measure [sic] to protect our citizens, property, and interests.8
Two years later, against the continuing backdrop of suspected Libyan governmental support
for terrorist attacks, a classified directive raised the prospect of unilateral military action to pre-
vent terrorist attacks. National Security Decision Directive 207 stated:
The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential
threat to our national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available.
The United States is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in
concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.
States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without
consequence. Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct
an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our cit-
izens, property, and interests. 9
7 The authors disagree with some scholarly characterizations of the U.S. blockade of Cuba during the 1962
Cuban missile crisis as preemptive self-defense. The claim to preemptive self-defense, at its core, is an asserted legal
right to use offensive military force against a target that does not yet, but may in the future, pose a threat. Although
the blockade could be characterized as preemptive action or as a measure of self-defense, it is not preemptive self-
defense. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall ofSaddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense,
97 AJIL 576, 584-85 (2003).
8 Extract of National Security Decision Directive 138 (signed Apr. 3, 1984), availableat <http://www.gwu.edu/
-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/nsdd138.pdf> (the full directive is still classified).
' National Security Decision Directive 207, The National Program for Combatting Terrorism (Jan. 20, 1986)
(formerly top secret), available at <http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/nsdd207.pdf>.
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Although initially confined to classified documents, the new policy was explicitly discussed
in newspaper articles and in speeches by high administration officials,1" a widely used and
internationally legally noted method for establishing national positions-indeed, even for
assuming international obligations. 1 In what later became known as the "Shultz doctrine,"
Secretary of State George Shultz argued for the right to take limited military action to address
terrorist threats while they are still "manageable."
In the wake of the recent attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, we have heard it asserted
that military action to retaliate or preempt terrorism is contrary to international law. Some
have suggested that even to contemplate using force against terrorism is to lower ourselves
to the barbaric level of the terrorists. I want to take this issue head on.
Unlike terrorists and communist guerrillas, we do not believe the end justifies the
means. We believe in the rule oflaw. This nation has long been a champion of international
law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the UN Charter as a code of conduct for the
world community.1 2
Noting the specific exception to the Charter's restrictions on the use or threat of force for the
right of self-defense, Secretary Shultz called it
absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in interna-
tional waters or airspace; from attacking them on the soil of other nations, even for the
purpose of rescuing hostages; or from using force against states that support, train, and har-
bor terrorists or guerrillas. International law requires no such result. A nation attacked by
terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists,
or to rescue its citizens when no other means is available. The law requires that such actions
be necessary and proportionate. But this nation has consistently affirmed the right of states
to use force in exercise of their right of individual or collective self-defense.13
Shultz strongly foreshadowed the position espoused by the Bush administration in 2002 by
arguing that
[a] llies and friends may object to our action--or say they object. But this cannot be deci-
sive. Striking against terrorism in the Middle East, for example, is bound to be controver-
sial. But the worst thing we could do to our moderate friends in the region is to demon-
strate that extremist policies succeed and that the United States is impotent to deal with
such challenges. 4
Well over a year earlier, in October 1984, Secretary Shultz had already advocated the devel-
opment of a domestic consensus on the right to use force preemptively in terrorist "gray areas"
of fact and law:
The heart of the challenge lies in those cases where international rules and traditional
practices do not apply. Terrorists will strike from areas where no governmental authority
10 See, e.g., Robert C. Toth, Preemptive Anti- Terrorist Raids Allowed, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1984, at A19.
1 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ REP. 253, 267-68 (Dec. 20); see also W. Michael Reisman & Mah-
noush H. Arsanjani, The Question of Unilateral Governmental Statements as Applicable Law in Investment Disputes,
19 ICSID REV. 328 (2004).
12 George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge ofAmbiguity, Address at National
Defense University (Jan. 15, 1986), BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POL'Y NO.
783, reprinted in 25 ILM 204, 206 (1986).
13 Id., 25 ILM at 206.
14 Id., 25 ILM at 205.
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exists, or they will base themselves behind what they expect will be the sanctuary of an
international border. And they will design their attacks to take place in precisely those
"gray areas" where the full facts cannot be known, where the challenge will not bring with
it an obvious or clear-cut choice of response.
In such cases we .... will have to examine the full range of measures available to us to
take. The outcome may be that we will face a choice between doing nothing or employing
military force .... [T] errorism is being used by our adversaries as a modern tool ofwarfare.
... We can expect more terrorism directed at our strategic interests around the world in
the years ahead. To combat it, we must be willing to use military force.'
5
Claims ofa right to unilateral preemption were more muted in the administration of George
H. W. Bush from 1988 to 1992. Indeed, directly after Shultz's speech in October 1984, then-
vice president Bush (perhaps not coincidentally one of the few leaders in the administration
to have had battle experience) publicly disagreed with the policy. Vice President Bush argued,
"I think you've got to pinpoint [the response to terrorism], and we're not going to go out and
bomb innocent civilians or something of that nature." '16
The claim to a right of preemptive self-defense was not limited to Republican administra-
tions. In the National Security Strategy for a New Century, published by the Clinton adminis-
tration in October 1998, the possibility of a claim to a right of preemption was indicated, but
more by implication:
Adversaries will be tempted to disrupt our critical infrastructures, impede continuity of
government operations, use weapons of mass destruction against civilians in our cities,
attack us when we gather at special events and prey on our citizens overseas. The United
States must act to deter or prevent such attacks and, if attacks occurs [sic] despite those
efforts, must be prepared to limit the damage they cause and respond decisively against the
perpetrators. 17
In 2000, however, the Clinton administration issued a new security document, A National
Security Strategy for a GlobalAge, in which more explicit attention was given to terrorism. With
respect to possible nuclear attacks from a symmetrical adversary, the policy continued to be
reactive: "Our military planning for the possible employment of U.S. strategic nuclear weap-
ons is focused on deterring a nuclear war and it emphasizes the survivability of our nuclear sys-
tems, infrastructure, and command, control, and communications systems necessary to endure
a preemptive attack yet still deliver an overwhelming response. " "'
A strategic posture of reaction rather than proaction would be consistent withArticle 51. But
in the same document, preemptive action is raised as a means of combating asymmetrical foes
who are using the techniques of terrorism. The U.S. "aggressive response to terrorism" is
described as follows:
Our strategy pressures terrorists, deters attacks, and responds forcefully to terrorist acts. It
combines enhanced law enforcement and intelligence efforts; vigorous diplomacy and
15 George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, Terrorism and the Modern World, Address at Park Avenue Synagogue
(Oct. 25, 1984), BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POL'Y NO. 629.
16 Don Oberdorfer &Juan Williams, Officials Spliton Shultz'sAntiterrorism Speech, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1984,
atAl.
17 A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FORA NEW CENTURY 7 (Oct. 1998), available at <http://www.fas.org/
man/docs/nssr-98.pdf>.
1
8 A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A GLOBAL AGE 17 (Dec. 2000), available at <http:/www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-00 1 2.pdf>.
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economic sanctions; and, when necessary, military force. Domestically, we seek to stop ter-
rorists before they act, and eliminate their support networks and financing. Overseas, we
seek to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries; counter state and non-governmental support for ter-
rorism; help other governments improve their physical and political counterterrorism,
antiterrorism, and consequence management efforts; tighten embassy and military facility
security; and protect U.S. citizens living and traveling abroad. Whether at home or abroad,
we will respond to terrorism through defensive readiness of our facilities and personnel,
and the ability of our terrorism consequence management efforts to mitigate injury and
damage.
Our strategy requires us to both prevent and, if necessary, respond to terrorism.' 9
The Clinton administration's 2000 document on security strategy proceeded to an even more
explicit formulation: "Whenever possible, we use law enforcement, diplomatic, and economic
tools to wage the fight against terrorism." Observing that those tools would not always be ade-
quate, the document asserted that "[a]s long as terrorists continue to target American citizens,
we reserve the right to act in self-defense by striking at their bases and those who sponsor, assist,
or actively support them, as we have done over the years in different countries.
2
1
Thus, the attack on September 11, 2001, rather than occasioning a radical change in strat-
egy, only reinforced incipient trends. On June 1, 2002, President Bush stated: "We must take
the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge."21
On September 17, 2002, he made explicit and expanded a claim to preemptive action in a new
National Security Strategy:
We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:
" direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international
power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and
any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;
* defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and
abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While
the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international com-
munity, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-de-
fense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm
against our people and our country; and
" denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or
compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.22
Even more explicitly, the president's National Strategy to Combat Weapons ofMass Destruc-
tion, issued in December 2002, stated: "Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of
the potentially devastating consequences of WMID use against our forces and civilian popu-
lation, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend
19 Id. at 23-24.
20 Id. at 24.
21 George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York
(June 1, 2002), 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 944, 946 (June 10, 2002).
22 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (Sept. 2002), available at <http:/www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html>.
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against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive mea-
sures."2 3 This is a claim of preemption in the broadest sense.24
The Bush administration is currently debating the military content of these preemptive
measures. A Pentagon draft "Doctrine forJoint Nuclear Operations" suggested that the United
States could deploy nuclear weapons in self-defense to preempt a WMD attack. 25 Congres-
sional leaders and arms control experts quickly criticized the draft document, however, and an
administration official emphasized that the doctrine had not yet been made final.26
Since the release of the 2002 National Strategy, members of the Bush administration have
indicated that the "Bush doctrine" of preemption may be more limited. One limiting factor
appears to be the presumed rationality of the state regime supporting terrorism. In distinguish-
ing the U.S. claim from potential claims to preemption in the contexts of the China/Taiwan
and India/Pakistan situations, a White House official explained:
I think what's different is the unique history of Iraq and the irrationality of Iraq. Different
policies work in different regions of the world, and different doctrines work at different
times and in different regions because of the local circumstances. Policies of containment
work more with a rational figure than with an irrational one. That's why the policy of con-
tainment worked vis a vis the Soviet Union.
... Given the fact that an irrational leader [Saddam Hussein] who has a history of mil-
itary force and military use and military aggression and domination may acquire a nuclear
weapon, the question is, should it be the policy of the United States to do nothing, and
allow such a leader to acquire a weapon that he could then use to blackmail the world and
blackmail the region, and even use it to harm us.
2 7
Then-national security adviser, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, similarly limited the policy, noting:
The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small. It does not give
a green light-to the United States or any other nation-to act first without exhausting
other means, including diplomacy. Preemptive action does not come at the beginning of
a long chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far out-
weigh the risks of action.2 8
In the newly released 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States, the Bush admin-
istration indeed appears to have moderated its initial expansive claims, while still retaining its
23 NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (Dec. 2002), available at
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf>.
24 John Yoo, deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel from 2001 to 2003, attempted in
thisJournalto position the 2002 claim to preemptive self-defense within the Caroline doctrine by arguing that the
definition of imminence "should" include the probability and the dangerousness of the threat and whether diplo-
macy is "practical." John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AJIL 563, 571-74 (2003). But note that
any balancing test can be made to support a preferred position by adding or subtracting variables from one side of
the equation.
25 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DOCTRINE FORJOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, FINAL COORDINATION (2), at
1-6 (Joint Publication 3-12, Mar. 15, 2005), available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/
dod/jp3- 2fc2.pdf>.
26 Walter Pincus, Pentagon May Have Doubts on Preemptive NuclearMoves, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,2005, at A5.
Pincus also notes that the unclassified draft document was removed from the Defense Department's Web site after
details were published in the newspapers.
27 White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing (Oct. 15,2002), available at <http:l/www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/10/20021015-5.html>.
28 Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses President's National Security Strategy, Wriston Lecture, Waldorf Astoria
Hotel (Oct. 1, 2002), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html>.
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claim to a right to use force preemptively. Although the new strategy proclaims that "[t] he place
of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same," 29 the 2006 version also
places much more emphasis on alternatives to military preemption and reliance on multilateral
solutions. The administration argues that "[t] aking action [to prevent proliferation ofweapons
of mass destruction] need not involve military force. Our strong preference and common prac-
tice is to address proliferation concerns through international diplomacy, in concert with key
allies and regional partners."3 ° Preemptive military action also appears to be limited to being
used against a "hard core of terrorists," who cannot be deterred and therefore must be "tracked
down, killed, or captured. '31 However, the strategy for confronting underlying networks sup-
porting terrorists is deterrence through "a broad range of tools."
32
The 2006 National Security Strategy provides further support to observers, who, in the after-
math of the war in Iraq, speculated that the Bush administration had already softened its claim
to a right of preemption in practice, if not in policy-particularly with respect to Iran and
North Korea. 33 Large-scale attacks on states appear to be less favored than strategic preemptive
strikes against weapons of mass destruction or terrorist training camps. This may be a tactical
change more than an international legal correction.
III.
In the period under review, the United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, appointed by the secretary-general, appears to have sided with those favoring a
certain loosening of the strict requirement of an "armed attack" for self-defense by resort to
unilateral military action. The panel stated:
The language of this article is restrictive: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain
international peace and security". However, a threatened State, according to long estab-
lished international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is immi-
nent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate. The problem arises
where the threat in question is not imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the
acquisition, with allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability.
34
The Red Queen may assign whatever meaning she wishes to words, but it is plain to us that
the language ofArticle 51, whether wise or not, was not designed to accommodate the Caroline
principle. The panel's interpretation appears to be an attempt at adjustment of the Charter to
29 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (Mar. 2006), available at <http:lwww.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2OO6.pdf>.
30 Id.
3' Id. at 12.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, After Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, §6 (Magazine), at 62; James
Sterngold, Bush Tempers Argument for Preemptive Strikes, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 2, 2004, at A10.
3' A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, at 54, para. 188 (2004), available at<http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf>.
This formulation, while broader than the Article 51 requirement, is narrower than the standard proposed in this
Journalby Richard Gardner, who argued for a reinterpretation of the UN Charter to allow for armed force to
counter transfers of WMD to terrorist groups and terrorists when the host state fails to suppress them. Richard N.
Gardner, Neither Bush Nor the 'Jurisprides," 97 AJIL 585, 590 (2003).
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meet part of the U.S. claim. 35 But only part of it! The high-level panel proceeded to make clear
that if imminent armed attack were now brought within the meaning of armed attack and uni-
lateral military action to head it off could now be potentially lawful, preemptive self-defense
could not be. Rejecting, in explicit terms, the possibility that acting "preventively (against a
non-imminent or non-proximate [threat])" could fall within the confines of lawful self-de-
fense, the panel explained:
For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world full of per-
ceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on
which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive
action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act
is to allow all.
36
Curiously, this part of the panel's report, with its subliminal emendation of the Charter, has
excited relatively little comment despite its radical character, for it would significantly change
the purport ofArticle 51 by moving it toward the U.S. position- unless, of course, the change




In a series ofjudgments and advisory opinions, the International Court ofJustice has hewed
to a rather strict reading ofArticle 51 of the United Nations Charter. Assessing the legal content
of the right to self-defense in the Nicaragua v. United States case of 1986, the Court surveyed
treaty law and customary international law and concluded: "In the case of individual self-de-
fence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having been the victim of an
armed attack." Noting the apparent "general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be
treated as constituting armed attacks," the Court pointed in particular to the agreement
that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed
forces across an international border, but also "the sending by or on behalf of a State of
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted
by regular forces, "or its substantial involvement therein."... It is also clear that it is the
State which is the victim of an armed attack which must form and declare the view that
it has been so attacked. There is no rule in customary international law permitting another
State to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of the
situation. Where collective self-defence is invoked, it is to be expected that the State for
whose benefit this right is used will have declared itself to be the victim of an armed
attack.38
35 W. Michael Reisman, Expanding the UN Security Council: Much Ado, JURIST, Aug. 7, 2005, available at
<http:ljurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/08/expanding-un-security-council-much-ado.php>.
3 6 A More Secure World, supra note 34, at 54-55, paras. 189, 191.
37 Thomas Franck argued in thisJournalas early as 1970 that Article 51 was of little use in distinguishing between
claims of self-defense and aggression. Thomas M. Franck, Who KilledArticle 2(4)? 64 AJIL 809, 818 (1970).
31 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 103-
04, para. 195 (June 27) (citation omitted (quoting Definition ofAggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex)) [here-
inafter Nicaragua].
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Seventeen years later, the International Court of Justice applied its interpretation of Article
51 in the Nicaragua Judgment to U.S. claims of self-defense in attacking Iranian oil installa-
tions. In the Court's view, the United States had to prove, as a factual matter, not only that Iran
was responsible for the attacks-a requirement that the United States was ultimately unable
to meet to the Court's satisfaction- but that "those attacks were of such a nature as to be qual-
ified as 'armed attacks' within the meaning of that expression in Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, and as understood in customary law on the use of force." 39 As to this legal
requirement, the Court harked back to Nicaragua:
As the Court observed in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua, it is necessary to distinguish "the most grave forms of the use of force
(those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms", since "In the case of indi-
vidual self-defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having been
the victim of an armed attack". The United States must also show that its actions were nec-
essary and proportional to the armed attack made on it, and that the platforms were a legit-
imate military target open to attack in the exercise of self-defence.
The Court similarly employed a strict reading of Article 51 in Legal Consequences ofthe Construc-
tion ofa Wallin the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, finding that Israel's claim of self-defense in con-
structing a military barrier in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was not relevant to the case:
Article 51 of the Charter... recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence
in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not
claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State.
The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of
the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different
from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001),
and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support of its claim
to be exercising a right of self-defence.
Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance
in this case." l
In its most recent holding in ArmedActivities on the Territory ofthe Congo, which was brought
under its contentious jurisdiction by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against
Uganda, the Court was required to address the issue of preemptive self-defense. On September
11, 1998, the Ugandan High Command had issued a document known as "Safe Haven." The
document asserted as purported fact a series of propositions: first, that the "enemies" of Uganda
had used the DRC as a base for attacks against it for a long time in the absence of effective con-
trol by the Congo of all its territory; second, that in May 1997 the two states had agreed on joint
operations by the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) and the Congolese army against the
forces of Uganda's enemies in the Congo; and third, that when the anti-Kabila rebellion began
in the DRC in 1998, the forces of the two sides were still operating against enemies of Uganda
who had returned to the DRC. Having thus set the scene, and "in order to secure Uganda's
legitimate security interests," "Safe Haven" assigned the Ugandan army the following tasks:
'9 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Merits, 2003 ICJ REP. 161, paras. 57, 61, 64, 71-72 (Nov. 6).
40Id., para. 51 (citations omitted (quoting Nicaragua at 101, para. 191, & 103, para. 195)).
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
para. 139 (Int'l Ct. Justice July 9, 2004), 43 ILM 1009 (2004) [hereinafter Wall Opinion].
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1. To deny the Sudan opportunity to use the territory of the DRC to destabilize Uganda.
2. To enable UPDF [to] neutralize Uganda dissident groups which have been receiving
assistance from the Government of the DRC and the Sudan.
3. To ensure that the political and administrative vacuum, and instability caused by the
fighting between the rebels and the Congolese Army and its allies do not adversely affect
the security of Uganda.
4. To prevent the genocidal elements, namely, the Interahamwe, and ex-FAR [Former
Armed Forces of Rwanda], which have been launching attacks on the people of Uganda
from the DRC, from continuing to do so.
5. To be in position to safeguard the territor[ial] integrity of Uganda against irrespon-
sible threats of invasion from certain forces.
42
None of the "legitimate security interests" in the five points in "Safe Haven" involves a
response to an armed attack. Each is either an action in anticipatory self-defense, in the sense
of the Caroline doctrine, or, insofar as the event for which military action is proposed is not
imminent, an action purportedly in preemptive self-defense, in the sense in which United
States administrations have used the term. Only item 2, to the extent that the facts supported
it, could clearly be characterized as anticipatory self-defense in the Caroline sense.
The Court remarked that "the objectives of operation 'Safe Haven', as stated in the Ugandan
High Command document, were not consonant with the concept of self-defence as under-
stood in international law." 3 After reciting Article 51 of the Charter, the Court continued:
The Court recalls that Uganda has insisted in this case that operation "Safe Haven" was
not a use of force against an anticipated attack. As was the case also in the Military andPara-
military Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States ofAmerica) case,
"reliance is placed by the Parties only on the right of self-defence in the case of an armed
attack which has already occurred, and the issue of the lawfulness ofa response to the immi-
nent threat of armed attack has not been raised". The Court there found that "[a]ccord-
ingly [it] expresses no view on that issue". So it is in the present case. The Court feels con-
strained, however, to observe that the wording of the Ugandan High Command
document on the position regarding the presence of the UPDF in the DRC makes no ref-
erence whatever to armed attacks that have already occurred against Uganda at the hands
of the DRC (or indeed by persons for whose action the DRC is claimed to be responsible).
Rather, the position of the High Command is that it is necessary "to secure Uganda's legit-
imate security interests". The specified security needs are essentially preventative ....
Only one of the five listed objectives refers to a response to acts that had already taken place-
the neutralization of "Uganda dissident groups which have been receiving assistance from the
Government of the DRC and the Sudan".
The Court also observed that Uganda had not reported the events purporting to justify self-
defense to the Security Council. Reverting to the strict contingency of Article 51, the Court
said, "[While Uganda claimed to have acted in self-defence, it did not ever claim that it had
been subjected to an armed attack by the armed forces of the DRC."4 5
As to whether a state is entitled to take actions in self-defense when it has suffered an armed
attack from a military force not affiliated with a state, the Court observed as a factual matter
42 Congo v. Uganda, supra note 4, para. 109.
I d., para. 119 (citation omitted).
41 Id., para. 143 (citation omitted (quoting Nicaragua at 103, para. 194)).
45 id., para. 146.
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that "on the evidence before it, even if this series of deplorable attacks could be regarded as
cumulative in character, they still remained non-attributable to the DRC." '4 6 As regards self-
defense against such irregular forces, the Court stated:
[T]he Court has no need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as to whether and
under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defence
against large-scale attacks by irregular forces. Equally, since the preconditions for the exer-
cise of self-defence do not exist in the circumstances of the present case, the Court has no
need to enquire whether such an entitlement to self-defence was in fact exercised in cir-
cumstances of necessity and in a manner that was proportionate. The Court cannot fail to
observe, however, that the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometres from
Uganda's border would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it
claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence, nor to be necessary to that end.
4 7
The question of self-defense with respect to armed bands or private armies48 not affiliated
with a state stands, of course, at the very center of the current expanded claim to preemptive
self-defense, for it has been assumed from the time of the Reagan administration that, by their
nature, they are unsusceptible to deterrence. As we have seen, the International Court had rejected
a right of self-defense to such armed attacks in the Nicaragua Judgment and the Wall opinion;
49
Congo v. Uganda might have provided an opportunity for the Court to revisit the issue, as Judge
Pieter Kooijmans observed in a separate opinion. As to the questions of whether a state from which
irregular forces sally forth is or is not responsible and whether such actions entide the target state to
undertake actions in self-defense, Judge Kooijmans suggested an analytical distinction:
The Court only deals with the question whether Uganda was entitled to act in self-defence
againsttheDRCand replies in the negative since the activities of the rebel movements could
not be attributed to the DRC. By doing so, the Court does not answer the question as to
the kind of action a victim State is entitled to take if the armed operation by irregulars,
"because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than
as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces" but no involve-
ment of the "host government" can be proved.5 °
In the Wall opinion, Judge Kooijmans wrote that Article 51 "conditions the exercise of the
inherent right of self-defence on a previous armed attack without saying that this armed attack
must come from another State even if this has been the generally accepted interpretation for
more than 50 years." 5 ' In Congo/Uganda, he observed that the Court's interpretation is no
longer shared by the Security Council.52 Moreover, he was not the only member of the Court
to hold this view. After agreeing with Judge Kooijmans that the Court should have addressed
the right to self-defense with respect to nonstate groups, Judge Bruno Simma elaborated the
point in his separate opinion:
46 Id.
17 Id., para. 147.
48 See generally W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AJIL 82 (2003); W. Michael
Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973).
49 Nicaragua at 103-04, paras. 194-95; Wall Opinion, supra note 41, para. 139.
50 Congo v. Uganda, supra note 4, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 26 (citation omitted (quoting
Nicaragua at 103, para. 195)).
51 Wall Opinion, supra note 41, para. 35.
52 Congo v. Uganda, supra note 4, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 28.
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Such a restrictive reading of Article 51 might well have reflected the state, or rather the prevail-
ing interpretation, of the international law on self-defence for a long time. However, in the light
of more recent developments not only in State practice but also with regard to accompanying
opiniojuris, it ought urgendy to be reconsidered, also by the Court. As is well known, these
developments were triggered by the terrorist attacks of September 11, in the wake of which
claims that Article 51 also covers defensive measures against terrorist groups have been received
far more favourably by the international community than other extensive re-readings of the rel-
evant Charter provisions, particularly the "Bush doctrine" justifying the pre-emptive use of
force. Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) cannot but be read as affir-
mations of the view that large-scale attacks by non-State actors can qualify as "armed attacks"
within the meaning of Article 51.1
3
V.
The Security Council has been skeptical about explicit unilateral claims of preemptive self-de-
fense. In 1981 the Council condemned Israel's preemptive strike against Iraq, 4 in part as follows:
Deeply concernedabout the danger to international peace and security created by the pre-
meditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations on 7 June 1981, which could at
any time explode the situation in the area, with grave consequences for the vital interests
of all States,
Considering that, under the terms of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United
Nations, "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations",
[the Security Council]
1. Strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the
United Nations and the norms of international conduct;
2. Calls upon Israel to refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof."5
In terms of explicit collective claims to preemptive self-defense, the Security Council has
remained silent. It has expressed neither support for nor disapproval of U.S. preemptive action
in Iraq, perhaps because, as a permanent member, the United States could veto any such res-
olution, rather than because the Council believed all of its other members shared the U.S. posi-
tion on this question of international law. 56 One need only recall that the Bush admin-
istration tried, but failed, to win Security Council authorization for the U.S. invasion of Iraq
of March 2003.51
Nevertheless, the Security Council has not accepted the International Court's interpretation
of Article 51, which, as will be recalled, requires state responsibility for the attack that provokes
53 Congo v. Uganda, supra note 4, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, para. 11.
5 See infra pt. VI, "Non-U.S. Coalition Partners."
" SC Res. 487 (June 19, 1981), 20 ILM 993 (1981).
56 The Security Council did, however, approve a resolution implicitly endorsing the U.S. occupation by autho-
rizing a "multinational force under unified command" to provide security in Iraq. SC Res. 1511 (Oct. 16, 2003),
43 ILM 254 (2004).
5' See, e.g., Elizabeth Neuffer, After Discord, UN's Effectiveness Called into Question, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18,
2003, at A29, available in Westlaw, All News Combined. But as Ruth Wedgwood notes, the Security Council later
passed Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003), providing political cover for states to engage in the reconstruction of Iraq.
Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 582.
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a claim of a right to self-defense. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the
United States, the Security Council was plainly operating on the understanding that both non-
state actors and the states that aid, support, or harbor them would be held accountable. In Res-
olution 1368, cited by the Court in the Wallcase and by Judges Kooijmans and Simma in their
separate opinions in Congo/Uganda, the Council,
Recognizingthe inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with
the Charter,
3. Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, orga-
nizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding,
supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be
held accountable.
58
Given the nature of the modus operandi of Al Qaeda and its cognate organizations, merely stating
that international law's right of self-defense applies to them may amount to a tacit acknowledgment
that sometimes self-defense may be lawfully used anticipatorily and even preemptively.
59
VI.
In the period since the United States lodged its broader claim, several governments have
openly debated the possibility of a right of preemptive self-defense. Classified memorandums
and contingency plans may be based on other legal theories, but public documents are almost
always phrased as proposing actions that are internationally lawful. The following discussion
examines two groups of states: those participating in the U.S. coalition effort in Iraq, part of
whose rationale was preemptive self-defense, and those that refused to take part and have been
critical of the U.S. action there.6" While any grouping is somewhat arbitrary, an initial exam-
ination reveals, rather surprisingly, that the position of a state on the lawfulness of the military
action in Iraq is not necessarily determinative of its adoption of-or position on-a policy of
preemption.
U.S. Partners in Iraq
Australia. The Australian government defends its adoption of a preemptive strike policy
against terrorists as a liberal interpretation of Article 51. Defense Minister Robert Hill has
argued,
[W] hen an armed attack against a State is imminent, that State is not compelled to wait
until the first blow has been struck. But what action can a State legitimately take when that
attack is to be launched by a non-State actor, in a non-conventional manner, operating
from a variety of bases in disparate parts of the world? There are no tell-tale warning indi-
cators such as the mobilisation and pre-deployment of conventional forces.
58 SC Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001), 40 ILM 1277 (2001).
5' The Security Council may yet moderate extended claims to preemptive self-defense, according to one scholar.
Jos6 E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AJIL 873, 888 (2003).
60 While the authors focus on government statements of policy, a question worth noting (but beyond the scope
of this essay) is whether states have realigned their actual military policies to adhere more closely to their polices,
or whether the government statements examined here are more aspirational in nature.
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Whilst the Charter of the U.N. adopted not dissimilar language (Article 51 permits the
use of self-defence "if criminal attack occurs"), it has not settled the debate between those
who adopt a literal interpretation and those who argue that contemporary reality demands
a more liberal interpretation.
Again the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice does not include a defin-
itive statement on the scope of the law of anticipatory self-defence under the Charter.
States act according to their interpretation, no doubt informed by the interpretations of
others. 6'
This liberal interpretation is also embodied in Australian military policy documents. National
Security: A Defence Update 2003 explains that "diplomacy and international cooperation will
not always succeed: the Australian Government may need to consider future requests to sup-
port coalition military operations to prevent the proliferation of WMD, including to rogue
states or terrorists, where peaceful efforts have failed."6 2
Similarly, a report by the Australian Air Force offers the following rationale for a preemptive
policy:
Strike may also take the form of a pre-emptive strike, aimed at deterring an aggressor
before major conflict erupts. While there would always be significant political and diplo-
matic consideration of any pre-emptive strike, confronted by irrefutable intelligence of
impending hostilities, the Government may exercise a pre-emptive strike option to remove
the immediate threat and demonstrate national resolve.
63
Australia was an early supporter of the U.S. preemption claim. In June 2002, following a
press conference on the ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, Prime
Minister John Howard stated:
[T]he principle that a country which believes it is likely to be attacked is entitled to take
preemptive action is a self-evidently defensible and valid principle .... [L]et me make it
very clear [that] if I were presented with evidence that Australia was about to be attacked
and I was told by our military people that by launching a preemptive hit we could prevent
that attack occurring I would authorise that preemptive hit and expect the Opposition to
support me in the process.
64
This comment, made well before the terrorist attacks of October 2002 in Bali, received little
public attention. In December 2002, however, Prime Minister Howard repeated his claim of
preemptive self-defense but within a different context. Asked whether Australia would act pre-
emptively on the basis of knowledge that terrorists in a neighboring country were planning an
attack, he replied:
Oh, yes, I think any Australian prime minister would. I mean, it stands to reason that if
you believed that somebody was going to launch an attack against your country, either of
61 Robert Hill, minister for defence,John Bray Memorial Oration, University of Adelaide (Nov. 28, 2002), avail-
able at <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/HillSpeechtpl.cfm?Currentld=2 121 >.62 AUSTRALIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY: A DEFENCE UPDATE 2003, at 16, available
at <http://www.defence.gov.au/ans2003/Report.pdf>.
3 Royal Australian Air Force, Military Operations Index: Strike (n.d.), available at <http://www.defence.
gov.au/raaf/organisation/info-on/operations/strike.htm>.
64 John Howard, Australian prime minister, Press Conference, Parliament House (June 20, 2002), available at
<http://www.pm.gov.au/News/interviews/2002/interviewl709.htm>.
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a conventional kind or of a terrorist kind, and you had a capacity to stop it and there was
no alternative other than to use that capacity then of course you would have to use it.
65
Less than a week after those comments, Prime Minister Howard met with high-level diplomats
from ten Southeast Asian nations in response to a widespread regional outcry.66 More recently,
he cast preemptive action as a theoretical, not a concrete, possibility.
I was not really stating that in relation to any country and I have the very strong view that
countries like Indonesia, with whom we have very close relationships, if action were needed
to be taken against groups that might threaten Australia then that action would be taken
by the Indonesian forces. I was simply stating a principle, . . . that if... in the future...
a countrywere unable or unwilling and the only way to protect Australia was to take action,
that that action would be taken. ... I don't think Australia would be alone in holding that
view but I certainly don't regard that ... statement of a last resort principle as something
that should be seen as being in any way antagonistic to any of our friends in the region and,
most particularly, Indonesia.
67
Japan. The Japanese government, while not engaged in combat in Iraq, has maintained ele-
ments of its Self-Defense Forces in Iraq since December 2003 to assist in humanitarian and
reconstruction efforts.
68
Under Article 9 of theJapanese Constitution, the Japanese people "forever renounce war as
a sovereign right of the nation and renounce the use of force as means of settling international
disputes." There is some movement within Japan to amend the Constitution to make the right
to self-defense explicit under Article 9.69 Despite these possible constitutional impediments,
in 2003 the Japanese parliament passed the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National
Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack. The law addresses situations of
armed attack and defines such a situation as one "where an Armed Attack against Japan from
the outside (including a case where an Armed Attack is imminent) has occurred [or one]
where an Armed Attack is anticipated as tensions arise." 7' Thus, the 2003 law contem-
plates two potential situations, one involving actual military attacks, and the other the
expectation of attacks. 71 Unlike positions advanced by other coalition partners, the Jap-
anese law requires "imminent and illegal invasion ofJapanese territory" to trigger the right
to self-defense. 72 The condition that an invasion must be "illegal" seems cosmetic. More
recently (and not coincidentally following North Korea's missile tests), a senior Japanese
6' Bob Burton,Australia: Premier Stands Firm on Anti-Terror'Strikes, IPS-INTER PRESS SERV., Dec. 2,2002 (quoting
Prime Minister John Howard, TV interview, Dec. 1,2002), available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories; transcript of inter-
view with Laurie Oaks available at < http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2002/interview215.htm>.
66 Teresa Cerojano, Philippine VP Defends Outcry over Australia, AAP NEWSFEED, Dec. 5, 2002, available in
LEXIS, AAP Newsfeed.
"7 John Howard, Australian prime minister, Interview with Metro TV (Indonesia) (Oct. 19, 2004), available at
<http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview 1130.html>.
68 JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY (May 2005), available at <http://
www.jda.go.jp/e/publications/overview/english.pdf>.
69 Tetsushi Kajimoto, Constitution Faces Long Road to Amendment, JAPAN TIMES, May 3, 2005, available in
LEXIS, Major World Newspapers.
7 0 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan White Paper (summary), §4 (2002), available at <http://www.
jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2002/0304.htm>.
" Upper House Begins Debating Military Contingency Bills, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, May 19, 2003, available
in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories.
72 Government Outlines New View on Self-Defense, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Jan. 26, 2004, at 1, available in
LEXIS, Major World Newspapers.
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official argued that attacking North Korea's missile bases should legally be considered as
self-defense. 73 Both China and North Korea have criticized the Japanese position as desta-
bilizing to the region.
74
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has not explicitly adopted the preemptive self-de-
fense doctrine described in the U.S National Security Strategy of 2002. But various remarks by
the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister, and the minister of veterans
affairs come close to it. In March 2004, Prime Minister Tony Blair stated:
Containment will not work in the face of the global threat that confronts us. The ter-
rorists have no intention of being contained. The states that proliferate or acquire WMD
illegally are doing so precisely to avoid containment. Emphatically I am not saying that
every situation leads to military action. But we surely have a duty and a right to prevent
the threat materialising . . . 75
In reaction, a select committee of the House of Commons concluded, "The Prime Minister's
words appear to support the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence." 7 ' This statement buttressed
an earlier finding by the Commons in 2002 that
[t] he Foreign Secretary appears to accept the principle ofpre-emption, as set out in the National
Security Strategy of the United States. He told us on 25 September that "If any nation feels that
it is threatened in a direct way then under Article 51 it has an inherent right to take action pre-
emptively." The Prime Minister has also asserted that "The one thing we have learned post- 11
September is that to take action in respect of a threat that is coming may be more sensible than
to wait for the threat to materialise and then to take action.""
The primary impetus for the United Kingdom's implicit, though inconsistent, support for
the U.S. preemption strategy is the need for an effective and timely response to the new
type of threats posed by terrorism. After the attacks on September 11,2001, the British
government commissioned a new chapter for its Strategic Defence Review, which had been
compiled in 1998.
Experience shows that it is better where possible, to engage an enemy at longer range,
before they [sic] get the opportunity to mount an assault on the UK. Not only is this more
effective than waiting to be attacked at a point and timing of an enemy's choosing, but it
can have a deterrent effect. We must therefore continue to be ready and willing to deploy
significant forces overseas and, when legally justified, to act against terrorists and those who
harbour them.7 8
73 Martin Fackler, Japan Finds Still Sterner Wordsfor North Korea Missile Tests, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2006, at A4.
" See, e.g., Japan's Security Bills Dangerous for Region, CHINA DAILY, June 9, 2003, available in LEXIS, Major
World Newspapers; North Korea Denounces Japan 'sMovesfor "Overseas Expansion,"BBC INT'L REP., June 5, 2003,
available in LEXIS, Individual Publications.
15 Tony Blair, Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat, Mar. 5, 2004, available at <http://
www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page5461 .asp>.
71 SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COMMONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
WAR AGAINST TERRORISM, SEVENTH REPORT, para. 420 (July 21, 2004), available at <http://www.publications.
parliament.uklpa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/441/44120.htm>.
77 SELECT COMMITFEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COMMONS, DISARMING IRAQ, SECOND
REPORT, para. 159 (Dec. 17, 2002), available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/
cmselect/cmfaff/ 196/19609.htm#n2 10> (footnotes omitted).
78 UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW: A NEW CHAPTER, para. 9 (July 2002),
at <http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/home> [hereinafter NEW CHAPTER]. In a progress report on the new
chapter, Minister of Defence Geoffrey Hoon stated: "all our analysis shows that tackling the problem at distance-
whether through prevention or, where justified, pre-emption, or through use of other effects in the framework we
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The point was pithily repeated later in the new chapter: "[A] 11 our analysis shows that tackling
the problem where possible at a distance is preferable to waiting for problems to come to us:
in that sense operations overseas are often the best form of home defence.
79
At the same time, many elements in the United Kingdom government have approached the U.S.
position with caution. The Ministry of Defence has noted the importance of a case-by-case
approach for preemptive action.8" In addition, the United Kingdom does not appear necessarily to
support unilateral preemptive action.8 The Defence Military Academy, which publishes papers
have developed-is much preferable to waiting for problems to come to us." Geoffrey Hoon, The New Chapter
to the Strategic Defence Review: A Progress Report, Speech to City Forum Roundtable (May 23,2002) (on file with
authors).
79 NEW CHAPTER, supra note 78, para. 77. A strategy of attacking problems abroad before they manifest them-
selves on British soil is also a prominent theme in discussions on restructuring the military. In April 2002, the vet-
erans minister stated:
The Ministry of Defence is therefore currently conducting work to re-examine our own defence posture
to ensure that we have the right defence concepts, forces and capabilities to defeat the threat from inter-
national terrorism. . . . But the initial findings are that we need to put more emphasis on taking the ini-
tiative and, where possible and justifiable, to pre-empt problems rather than simply wait for problems to
come to us.
OpeningAddress by Dr. Lewis Moonie MP, minister for veterans affairs, to Veteran Plenary Forum (Apr. 17, 2002)
(on file with authors).
" In a letter to the House of Commons, the Defence Ministry summarized key discussion points of a 2002 sem-
inar, stating: "Pre-emptive action-and particularly a series of pre-emptive actions-is likely to create serious dif-
ficulties for coalition cohesion. We cannot be dogmatic in pursuing pre-emptive action: a case by case analysis will
be required before any action is undertaken." Select Committee on Defence, House of Commons, Appendices to
the Minutes of Evidence, App. 10, Letter from Ministry of Defence to Committee Specialist Summarising Key
Points ofBirmingham Seminar 28 February 2002 (May7, 2003), available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/93/93ap I l.htm> (seminar discussed new chapter).
81 Id., App. 1, Letter to the Committee Specialist from the Ministry of Defence (May 17, 2002), available at
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/93/93apO2.htm>.
[House of Commons] The New Chapter consultation paper uses terms such as prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt and
destroy-does this mean that apre-emptive role [of] the UKforces is at the heart of the New Chapter in the war
on terrorism? Can the UKactually do any ofthese things alone and ifnot howfar is our understanding ofthisproblem
shared by likely allies or collaborators?
[Administration Response] ... We will set out more developed thinking when we publish some conclu-
sions. But the UN, NATO, the EU and other organisations have all played key roles in recent months, and
we see them all playing key roles in future. We continue to regard it as vital for the US and its European Allies
to be able to operate together (as many Allies are doing now in Afghanistan), and for the Europeans to make
improvements in their capabilities to facilitate that. We fully recognise that, in the future as in the past, effective
coalition operations will normally be the key to success, and that we therefore needed a shared approach, shared
doctrine and interoperable capabilities. We have been continuing to work to those ends.
We have already indicated that we need to put more emphasis on being proactive and, where possible and
justifiable, pre-empting problems, rather than simply waiting for problems to come to us. In that, we should
use the whole range of responses that the Government has at its disposal-not just military means.
See also INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WARAGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 76, para. 404. The report relates
that the foreign secretary appeared before the committee on March 30, 2004, and "underlined the Government's
advocacy of reform of the system of international law." The committee asked "how the Government might respond
to evidence of an imminent threat by terrorists with access to WMD, but when there was little certainty as to the
target." The minister responded as follows:
If it was that imminent and country X perceived that the threat could apply to them, then I think that they
would be justified in acting in self-defence and there is nothing in Article 51 which could prevent that. If it
was a wider, more general threat, then although there might not be the time nor might it be desirable to have
a public debate, there would almost certainly be time secretly to consult [the five permanent members of the
Security Council] partners who are crucial to any decision and if they were on board, in practice the Security
Council would be.
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produced by the Conflict Research and Security Centre, takes a skeptical view of preemptive strikes,
although for practical, not legal, reasons.
8 2
The new chapter specifically notes that preemption is allowed only when "legally" justified:
We have made clear that our responses will be proportionate and in accordance with our
international legal obligations. But we will not let the less scrupulous think we do not mean
business, or simplify an aggressor's calculations by announcing how we would respond in
particular circumstances. The only certainty we should offer is that we shall respond
appropriately if we need to, using any of the wide range of options open to us. It should
be clear that legally the right to self defence includes the possibility of action in the face of
an imminent attack.
83
That position, of course, assumes that preemptive military action may sometimes be lawful.
Note also that the term "imminent" appears to have undergone a certain longitudinal extension
in the new chapter. Indeed, the UK Ministry of Defence does not appear to believe that inter-
national law imposes severe limits. One exchange in the House of Commons suggests that the
UK military takes a rather broad view of international law in this regard.84
In contrast to the public documents indicating some degree of support for the implicit
acceptance of the U.S. strategy, Attorney General Goldsmith, in a recently leaked document,
explicitly stated in 2003:
[I] n my opinion there must be some degree of imminence. I am aware that the USA has
been arguing for recognition of a broad doctrine of a right to use force to pre-empt danger
82 C. J. DICK, THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT-LOOKING OUT TO 2020, at 22, 36 (Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Defense Academy, No. M30, Apr. 2003), available at <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/
Special/M30-CJD.pdf/file view>. The report notes:
Deterring intra-state conflict, including by pre-emptive deployments, is theoretically attractive and may
become fashionable but will be fraught with problems....
... Despite the lessons of the wars of Yugoslav succession and, arguably, the long-term threat posed by
Saddam's missiles and WMD, it will be very difficult to convince many electorates that such action will be
cheaper in the long run. Pre-emptive actions may also be morally and legally dubious and therefore politically
divisive, both domestically and internationally (including between allies). President Bush's strident demands
for war to disarm Iraq and more controversially, to effect regime change is a case in point.
... One way or another, the USA will leave itself open to charges of hypocrisy, selectivity and bully-boy
behaviour, not to mention the deliberate flouting of international law through mounting dubious pre-emptive
attacks.
83 NEW CHAPTER, supra note 78, para. 22.
84 The Select Committee on Defence asked the secretary of state for defence the following question:
[House of Commons] Are you saying then that if there were a second Resolution of the United Nations which
was not carried, but in fact was defeated and the outcome was that it was not right for a war to be engaged in
at this time against Iraq, would you then say that if the United Kingdom and the United States were to act
unilaterally and go ahead and engage in a war with Iraq, basically they would be working within the realms
of the law?
(MrHoon) I indicated earlier that there are different sources of international law. There is the common law
of international nations which provides basic principles like self-defence, for example. There is also the law
made by the Security Council of the United Nations and indeed by the General Assembly, so there is a range
of ways in which action would be justified, but I assure you that whatever decision is taken by the British Gov-
ernment would be in conformity with international law.
Select Committee on Defence, House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, para. 691
(Mar. 5, 2003), available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2002O3/cmselect/cmdfence/93/
3030505.htm>.
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in the future. If this means more than a right to respond proportionately to an imminent
attack (and I understand that the doctrine is intended to carry that connotation) this is not
a doctrine which, in my opinion, exists or is recognised in international law.
8 5
Non- U.S. Coalition Partners
China. The Chinese government has criticized the U.S. preemptive policy because it
"mainly relies on subjective judgments, and is very easily abused and used as a pretext for war.
So, the US' 'pre-emptive' strategy is in fact a logic of the powerful." '86 Notwithstanding this
criticism, such action appears to be contemplated as permissible in the context of China's
claims to Taiwan, with respect to which the Chinese government seems to support a limited
version of a right to preemptive action. In March 2005, the People's Congress of China
adopted an antisecession law that authorizes "non-peaceful means" in the event of overt Tai-
wanese secessionist actions, or even once "possibilities for a peaceful reunification" are exhaust-
ed.87 Although the latter conclusion, of course, would rely mainly on subjective judgments,
would be susceptible to abuse, and could be used as a pretext for war, the People's Congress
seemed oblivious to the irony.
France. Despite France's vocal opposition to the war in Iraq, it, too, has announced a defense
policy that would allow for preemptive action. In a policy statement for 2003-2008, the
French government noted:
Outside our borders, within the framework of prevention and projection-action, we
must be able to identify and prevent threats as soon as possible. Within this framework,
possible preemptive action is not out of the question, where an explicit and confirmed
threat has been recognized. This determination and the improvement of long range strike
capabilities should constitute a deterrent threat for our potential aggressors, especially as
transnational terrorist networks develop and organise outside our territory, in areas not
governed by states, and even at times with the help of enemy states.
Prevention is the first step in the implementation of our defence strategy, whose choices
have been confirmed by the appearance of the asymmetric threat phenomenon.8 8
This statement, like many of the other examples, focuses on the asymmetrical threat presented
by terrorists. As an additional deterrent to terrorist attacks, President Jacques Chirac recently
stated that retaliations for large state-backed terrorist attacks against France could involve the
use of nuclear weapons. In a speech delivered at a military base, President Chirac asserted that
85 Attorney General Goldsmith, Iraq: Resolution 1441 (Mar. 7, 2003), available at <http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/files/pdf/Iraq%20Resolution%201441.pdf> (secret memo to UK prime minister, leaked Apr. 2005).
This section was not included in the first publicly released version of the opinion in March 2003. Attorney General
Goldsmith, Iraq: Legality ofArmed Force, HANSARD, House of Lords, vol. 6 46, col. WA3 (Mar. 17, 2003), avail-
able at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldvol646.htm> (summary). Indeed, in initial discussions
about the legality of military action, the British government refused to base its actions on the U.S. preemptive doc-
trine. Instead, in accordance with Attorney General Goldsmith's opinion, the purported basis was the breach of
Security Council resolutions.
86 Quoted in China, Taiwan Press, BBC INT'L REP., Feb. 8, 2006 (citing CHINA DEFENSE DAILY), available
in LEXIS Academic.
87 Full Text ofNewly PassedAnti-Secession Law, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 15, 2005, available in LEXIS, Major World
Newspapers, also available in People's Republic of China, Order of the President No. 34, Mar. 14, 2005 (promul-
gating the law), at <http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2005/CD-140305.htm> (English trans.).
88 FRANCE, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 2003-2008 MILITARY PROGRAMME, BILL OF LAW, available at <http:I
www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/mindefa.pdf>.
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nuclear deterrence is not intended to deter fanatical terrorists. Yet, the leaders of States who
would use terrorist means against us, as well as those who would consider using, in one way
or another, weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves
open to a firm and adapted response on our part. And this response could be a conventional
one. It could also be of a different kind.8 9
India. Federal finance minister Jaswant Singh has said that every country has a right to con-
duct preemptive strikes as an inherent part of its right of self-defense and that it is not the pre-
rogative of any one nation. "Pre-emption or prevention is inherent in deterrence. Where there
is deterrence there is pre-emption. The same thing is there in Article 51 of the UN Charter
which calls it 'the right of self-defence'....,,90
Iran. Iran has adopted a dual strategy in light of the U.S. claims of a right to preemptive self-
defense. First, it has explicitly raised the costs of a potential preemptive attack against it by
declaring that an attack on its nuclear facilities would amount to an attack on the entire coun-
try. Moreover, the Iranian government noted that it would not distinguish between the United
States and Israel in the event of an attack by Israeli forces. 91 Second, Defense Minister Ali
Shamkhani has signaled that the Iranian government may also invoke a right to preemptive
self-defense against targets on U.S. soil or against U.S. forces in the Middle East.
ALl SHAMKHANI: The presence of the US military doesn't empower the US at our expense.
The opposite is true. We can hold their troops hostage.
ANCHOR: You say that Iran has a presence in the Gulf, in Iraq, and in Afghanistan, which
means that if the US attacks you, you can respond.
Is that a correct interpretation?
ALl SHAMKHANI: We won't stay silent and wait for others to act against us. Some among
Iran's military leadership are confident that the preventive operations being discussed by
the Americans aren't limited to them.9 2
Israel. The Israeli raid on the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 remains the clearest example of
a preemptive use of force in the period following World War 11.93 Israel has also practiced tar-
geted assassinations, which might be characterized as a form of preemptive self-defense. 94 In
the period covered in this essay, Israel has made an explicit claim of a right to preemptive self-
defense in the context of the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. The Amended Disengagement
Plan of 2004 indicated that "[t]he State of Israel reserves its fundamental right of self-defense,
both preventive and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in respect of threats
emanating from the Gaza Strip." '9 5
89 Jacques Chirac, Speech to Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at Landivisiau (Jan. 19, 2006), available at
<http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/speeches-and-documents/2006/speech-by-jacques-
chirac-president of the french republic-during-his-visit-tothe-stategicforces.38447.html>.
90 Every Country Has Right to Pre-emption:Jaswant, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, Sept. 30, 2002, available in LEXIS,
Wire Service Stories.
9" Interview with Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani (Aug. 18, 2004), FED. NEWS SERV., Aug. 19, 2004,
available in LEXIS, Individual Publications.
92 Id.
93 Reisman, supra note 48.
9' See generally Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, 'WeMustNotMakea Scarecrow ofthe Law:A LegalAnal-
ysis of the Israeli Polity of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233 (2003).
9' Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon-Revised, §3(1) (3), May 28, 2004, available at <http://
www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/DisengageSharon-eng-revised.htm>.
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North Korea. In February 2003, in the context of continuing discussions on North Korea's
alleged nuclear program, the Foreign Ministry declared that North Korea was entitled to
launch a preemptive strike against U.S. forces rather than wait until the American military was
finished with Iraq. The deputy director stated, "The United States says that after Iraq, we are
next .... but we have our own counter-measures. Pre-emptive attacks are not the exclusive
right of the US."96 Similarly, in September 2004, Yang Hyong-sop, vice president of the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, stated that "[a] pre-emptive attack is not a monop-
oly of the US." '97
Russia. Following the seizure of a school in Beslan by Chechen militants, the Russian gov-
ernment indicated its willingness to strike at terrorists preemptively. President Vladimir Putin
declared on September 17, 2004, that "[t] oday in Russia, we are seriously preparing to act pre-
ventively against terrorists .... This will be in strict respect with the law and constitution and
on the basis of international law."9 8 The defense minister has proclaimed that Russia
claims a right of preemptive strikes against terrorists anywhere in the world. 99 At the same
time, Russian officials have noted that their preemptive strikes will not include the use of
nuclear weapons. 100
This policy stands in marked contrast to numerous public statements prior to the U.S.-led
attacks against Iraq, which the Russian government loudly denounced."' President Putin
even lamented the "replacement of international law with the law of the jungle. 1 ° 2 One for-
mer high-level Russian official believes the recent statements endorsing preemptive strikes
are more likely a diplomatic overture to the United States and NATO than a concrete state-
ment on military policy. 10 3 In any event, both the United States and the United Kingdom have
publicly supported the change in Russian policy.'0 4
Taiwan. Well before the passage of the Chinese Anti-Secession Law, Taiwan had invoked
the right to preemptive action against China. In 2003 Taiwan's defense minister refused to rule
out "preemptive attacks" against military targets in China in circumstances involving clear
Chinese intent and military mobilization. ' 5 In fact, the minister's contingency seems more on
the order of anticipatory than preemptive self-defense.
96 Yong Tiam Kui, Australia, N. Korea Join 'Preemptive'Bandwagon, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at
4, available in LEXIS, Major World Newspapers.
9' North Korean Official Says Pre-emptive Attack "Not a Monopoly of the US, " GLOBAL NEWSWIRE, Sept. 10,
2004, available in LEXIS, Individual Publications.
98 Putin Says Russia 'Seriously' Preparing Preventive Strikes, Rejects Talks, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 17,
2004, available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus.
99 Ivanov: Military Force Remains a Political and Anti-Terrorist Instrument, News from Russia (compiled by
Russian Foreign Ministry) (Dec. 17, 2004), available at <http://www.india.mid.ru/nfr2004/nf51.html>.
'0' Russia's "Preventive Strike"Rhetoric Seen as OliveBranch to NA TO and USA, BBC INT'L REP., Sept. 12,2004,
available in LEXIS, Individual Publications.
1' See, e.g., Christian Caryl, BalancingAct, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 2003, available in LEXIS, Magazine Stories,
Combined.
102 Veronika Voskoboinikova, Putin-Iraq Statement, ITAR-TASS, Mar. 20, 2003, available in LEXIS, Wire Ser-
vice Stories.
103 BBC INT'L REP., supra note 100.
104 See, e.g., Nicholas Kralev, Russia Vows Pre-emptive Terror Hits, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 9,2004, atAl, available
in LEXIS, News, Most Recent Two Years; Cam Simpson, U.S. Voices Support, Caution on Russia's Terrorism War,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 2004, at 4, available in LEXIS, News, Most Recent Two Years.
105 Taiwan Cannot Rule out Pre-emptiveAttacks on Mainland-DefenceMinister, BBC INT'L REP., Oct. 9, 2003,
available in LEXIS, Individual Publications.
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VII.
The initial assertions of a right of preemptive self-defense by the Bush administration in
2002 were cast more broadly than those of its predecessors. Even though the broader claim was
provoked and conditioned by the attacks of September 11, 2001, its open-textured formula-
tion could be interpreted to include surprise attacks on other states. As we have seen, this is how
some members of the British government, which was hardly unfriendly to the United States
and its military program, read it. The British reading may not have been off the mark. Signif-
icant statements of national military doctrine are not made hastily. The NationalSecurity Strat-
egy of 2002 may have already been in the works and designed to prepare the world for direct
action against Iraq, one of whose justifications was preemptive self-defense.
Significantly, not all states' claims of rights of preemptive self-defense that we have been able
to find appear to contemplate a right to attack another state preemptively. Rather, the more
common formulation appears to be a right to use force in a preemptive fashion against nonstate
entities employing what have come to be called "terrorist" methods. One variation on this leit-
motif, in statements by the United States, France, and Australia, appears to be the right to strike
preemptively against states only in the face of a risk that terrorists will acquire weapons of mass
destruction from a "rogue state." (These particular conclusions are perforce speculative, for we
do not have access to secret "contingency plans," which may be based on much broader con-
ceptions of preemptive self-defense.) Hence, the policy of preemptive strikes of many of the
states reviewed here appears more narrowly confined to cases of (1) nonstate entities, such as
terrorists, who may or may not possess weapons of mass destruction; and (2) states in which
there is a risk that terrorists will acquire weapons of mass destruction.1"6
We have thus far focused on affirmative claims. Many governments have explicitly refused
to recognize the 2002 claim of the United States as indicative of, or consistent with, interna-
tional law. Then-chancellor Gerhard Schr6der explicitly stated his disagreement with the U.S.
claims to the right to preemption. 107 The Spanish prime minister, citing Iraq as an example of
failure, averred, "[P]re-emptive wars, never again; violations of international law, never
again.""0 8 The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers similarly condemned "the principle of
preemptive military strikes against any country under any pretext whatsoever. "109
Thus, insofar as the college of jurists may have considered the claim to use military force
preemptively as a serious erosion of international restraints on the use of force and, in the worst
sense, simply as a euphemism for aggression, the examination of statements of political leaders
made in the last five years in the contexts of national political debates may provide a modest
degree, if not of comfort, then at least of relief for being able to conclude that it could have been
worse. Very few of the more recent statements seem to contemplate or claim a right to direct
106 The statements presented here demonstrate the dynamic nature of customary law. Just two years ago, Michael
Byers assessed claims to preemptive self-defense in his broader examination of the Proliferation Security Initiative
and found the initial claims by a few states outweighed by increasing criticism of the war in Iraq. Since 2004, how-
ever, some states have adroitly asserted a claim to preemptive self-defense while maintaining their critical stance on
U.S. actions in Iraq. Michael Byers, Policingthe High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AJIL 526, 541-43
(2004).
107 Interview with Chancellor Gerhard Schr6der, Tagesthemen (ARD television broadcastJan. 29, 2003) (on file
with authors).
"' Iraq Proves Pre-emptive Wars Fail: Spanish PM, AP, May 3, 2004, available in LEXIS Academic.
'0' Final Communique of the Thirty-first Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Istanbul, para.
41 (June 16, 2004), reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN Doc. A/58/
856-S/2004/582, at 6, 13.
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preemptive attacks against other states. Only Iran and North Korea appear to sanction and to
claim the privilege of such action and, in fairness to them, it must be acknowledged that each
may have been impelled to that position by its perception of preemptive threats from signif-
icant political adversaries. Almost all of the remaining states seem to be focused on actions
against nonstate entities and, in virtually all the statements, the assumed context appears to be
serial conflicts; that is, continuing conflicts marked by intermittent explosions of violence, fol-
lowed by relatively long periods of quiescence without formal termination of the hostilities,
succeeded by renewed explosions of violence. In this respect, one wonders if the claimed right
of preemptive self-defense may be subsiding into a right to initiate the use of force in ongoing
overt conflicts, without awaiting a specific provocation. But even under these more limited cir-
cumstances, claims of preemptive self-defense would involve uses of force in an ever-widening
arena, and any possible gain in the restoration of minimum order will have been secured at the
cost of a geographical extension of the conflict. On the other hand, a preemptive attack on Ira-
nian nuclear installations would depart from the narrowing and qualifying trend we have
described and could signal a claim to initiate a major change in theJus ad bellum.
Even if claims to preemptive self-defense are henceforth limited to military actions in pro-
tracted low-level conflicts and not permitted for Pearl Harbor-type initiations of interstate
war, all such claims are clearly incompatible with conceptions of the legal use of force in self-
defense as understood by the International Court of Justice in its recent decisions. A discrep-
ancy between practice and formal law-between myth system and operational code"--is
hardly unique to the international legal system. But uncertainty about precisely what the law
prohibits is always an invitation to adventurism; and adventurism with highly destructive and
nondiscriminating weapons is a particularly frightening prospect. In any event, if one were to
hazard a prediction in this fluid situation, it would be that a conception of lawful self-defense
incorporating only the Caroline doctrine will continue for most matters; beyond that, the right
of self-defense will have been relaxed only for the so-called war against terrorism.
But just as this broad, but necessarily incomplete, survey may have provided some comfort,
so increasing legal mimesis may accelerate the drift away from the binary formulation ofArticle
51 (which presents its own problems) toward a vaguer, and possibly less stable, definition of
the right to use force."' Imitation is said to be the highest compliment. And in this instance,
the United States has developed some unlikely-and from its perspective, undesired-admir-
ers. Two of the three remaining "axis of evil" members, North Korea and Iran, quickly adopted
the U.S. claim in potential defense of their own fragile international positions. "' Perhaps more
significant for international lawmaking purposes, Russia specifically noted that it was not the
" 0 W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES (1979).
... Although the authors disagree with Thomas Franck's argument that the U.S. invasion of Iraq signaled an
abrogation, rather than a possible transformation, of the international legal order pertaining to the use of force and
self-defense, his broader points regarding who decides when force is justified as preemptive self-defense and who
then reviews the lawfulness of that military action is particularly relevant here. This essay has focused on the shifting
definitions attached to "attack," "imminence," and "self-defense," but even once the content of these definitions
is certain, the question of who decides and who then reviews when these definitions will be applied (the Security
Council, a jury of states, or just the state asserting the right to preemptive action) remains. Under Article 51 of the
UN Charter, of course, it is the threatened state that decides. Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United
Nations Afier Iraq, 97 AJIL 607, 616 (2003).
112 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 125, 135
(Feb. 4, 2002), available at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/2002.html> (noting that Iraq, North Korea, and
Iran constituted an axis of evil).
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first government to announce a policy of preemptive self-defense. According to Defense Min-
ister Ivanov, "Whether we like it or not, the pre-emptive use of force in the modern world is
a reality. While this principle exists, we are not going to relinquish it voluntarily.""'13 The
House of Commons noted this very danger in requesting the Blair government to assist in
developing a clear international consensus on the right to use force in self-defense. Otherwise,
"there is a serious risk that [justifying action against Iraq on an "expanded doctrine of 'pre-
emptive self-defence"'] will be taken as legitimising the aggressive use of force by other, less
law-abiding states." 114 Prime Minister Howard has rejected the substance of these warnings,
arguing that there has been "too great a tendency to impute a generalised intention on the part
of the United States to adopt what you call a pre-emptive strike policy." " 5
In the grip of mimetic effects, however, the actual policy of the United States becomes less impor-
tant than the policy that continues to be imputed to it. In its inferences with respect to evolving
custom, international law will take account of the policies and practices ofall nations. Although the
U.S. policy may now be more limited than initially claimed, other states may not have received that
message. Some may reactively adopt exaggerated preemption policies with respect to their own
latent adversaries, thus skewing assessments of international consensus and practice back toward a
position that ironically may no longer be claimed by those major powers that had brought the claim
to the fore. Hence, what appears to be a growing adoption of claims to preemptive self-defense in
limited circumstances may mistake political posturing for international consensus, with grave con-
sequences for both the expectation and eventuation of violence.
There are other hidden costs to broad claims of preemptive self-defense. Although the doc-
trine of the United States not unreasonably aims at enhancing its own security against an adver-
sary apparently impervious to deterrence, wider adoption of a legal policy of preemptive self-
defense may actually undermine international security. States may simply appropriate the
language of preemption to fit their individual security concerns and the strategies they craft to
maintain their security-essentially becoming "free riders" in the international legal system.
For example, North Korea has justified its further development of nuclear weapons as essential
to its self-defense against U.S. claims of a right to preemptive self-defense." 6 Such invocations
of U.S. policies to justify domestic measures in other states is apparent in other areas influenced
by the "war on terror." The UN special rapporteur on independence and the judiciary notes
a downward spiral as states refashion U.S. policy for their particular local circumstances:
Based on the doctrine of counter-terrorism and sometimes even taking inspiration from
the status of "enemy combatant", the governments of many States have adopted or
113 Russia NotPlanningto Give up RightofPre-emptiveStrikes-DefenceMinister, BBC INTL REP., Oct. 20,2003,
available in LEXIS, Individual Publications.
114 SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 77, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
para. 154(r), available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20023/cmselect/cmfaff/I96/19603.htm>
(citation omitted).
"I Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Interview with Leon Delaney, Radio 2SM (Oct. 10, 2003), avail-
able at <http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interviews5 1 7.html>; see also Where's the RedLine? NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 17, 2003, at 36, available in LEXIS, Magazine Stories, Combined.
116 North Korea Not Bound byMissile Test Moratorium-Text, BBC INT'L REP., Mar. 3,2005 (quoting Foreign Min-
istry of North Korea, Memorandum of DPRK Foreign Ministry (Mar. 2, 2005)), available in LEXIS, Individual Pub-
lications (stating, "Therefore, it is quite natural that the DPRK has manufactured nukes for self-defence and continues
to do so to cope with the policy of the Bush administration aimed at mounting a pre-emptive nuclear attack on it.").
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strengthened legal instruments giving them powers of detention beyond all judicial con-
trol which, depending on the context, they use to detain terrorist suspects, political oppo-
nents, refugees or asylum seekers.
1 7
These mimetic and free-riding effects remained somewhat muted during the initial iteration
of claims to a right of preemptive self-defense under the Reagan administration. Perhaps this
restraint resulted from the controls the superpowers in a then-bipolar system exercised over the
various states within their zones of influence and, ironically, the sense of security derived from
the relative military parity of the two superpowers." 8 The point is not to be nostalgic about
the Cold War but simply to note that because the controls exercised by the formal institutions
of international law are not yet comparably effective in the sphere of international security,
these implications should be borne in mind when contemplating the expansion of the legal
boundaries of unilateral military action.
The dangers of legal mimesis and free riding are further amplified by the international com-
munity's failure thus far to formulate a consensus definition of "terrorism." Definitions estab-
lish a focus. Definitions of terrorism are especially outcome sensitive because they tend to
delimit the range of lawful responses to them. " 9 As a result, international politics, in prov-
ing itself unable to adopt a comprehensive definition of the terrorist actions that have pro-
voked many of the claims to preemptive self-defense, may, in turn, be provoking even broader
claims to it.
117 Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,
UN Doc. EICN.412005160, para. 36.
118 Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule ofLaw, 83 AJIL 259,266-69 (1989). The world has changed sig-
nificantly since Schachter noted the potentially destabilizing effect of uncertainty and indeterminacy of evaluating
unilateral claims to preemptive self-defense, restrained at that time through power politics and the widely accepted
norm against using force to achieve objectives previously thought legitimate, such as economic gain or fulfillment
of a "manifest destiny."
19 For further discussion of terrorism and international law, see Reisman, supra note 2.
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